

ELECTRIC GRID BOOTCAMP

Diane Holder

VP, Engineering and Strategic Engagement

August 18, 2026





RELIABILITY FIRST

The sole purpose of this presentation is to provide technical reliability-related information based on ReliabilityFirst's expertise. This communication is not intended to be and should not be interpreted as advocating for a specific position or outcome.

WELCOME










2025 NERC Risk Report Five Critical Risks



01 Grid Transformation



02

Resilience to
Extreme Events



03

Critical
Infrastructure
Interdependencies



04

Security

05 Energy Policy

Energy Policy Volatility & Misalignment

-----Key Concerns-----

Grid Reliability

- Misaligned policies and implementation timelines, combined with permitting delays, limit efforts to meet rising load growth and upgrade aging infrastructure

Infrastructure Bottlenecks

- Lengthy development and construction processes, driven in part by jurisdictional complexity and local opposition, delay transmission and generation projects

Energy Resource Integration


- Integrating diverse power sources requires enhanced transmission and storage infrastructure to meet growing demand and withstand extreme weather

What To Do?

Recommendation	Timeframe	Interdependence	Risk Addressed
1. Policymakers should adopt a three-pronged principles-based approach to decision-making.	1-2 years	Broad – applicable to all risk profiles	Policy volatility; Policy misalignment
2. Policymakers should adopt a durable “all of the above” approach that considers energy sufficiency and the full spectrum of resource options and services required to keep the BPS reliable.	1-2 years	Grid Transformation, Resilience to Extreme Events, and Critical Infrastructure Dependencies	Policy volatility; Policy misalignment
3. Prioritize technical education for policy makers	1-2 years	Broad – applicable to all risk profiles	Technical deficiencies in policy development
4. Prioritize increased coordination and collaboration	1-2 years	Broad – applicable to all risk profiles	Policy misalignment

INITIATIVES, INSIGHTS, & RECOMMENDATIONS

**Data Centers
&
Large Loads**



**IBR
Registration**

**Natural Gas-
Electric
Coordination**



**Modernization
of Standards**

IBR REGISTRATION

Phase 1:
May 2023 – May 2024

- Complete Rules of Procedure revisions and approvals
- Commence Category 2 GO and GOP candidate outreach and education

Phase 2:
May 2024 – May 2025

- Complete identification of Category 2 GO and GOP candidates
- Continue Category 2 GO and GOP candidate outreach and education

Phase 3:
May 2025 – May 2026

- Complete registration of Category 2 GO and GOP candidates thereafter subject to applicable NERC Reliability standards
- Conduct specific Category 2 GO and GOP outreach and education

Region:	# Category 2 Sites Registered:
ReliabilityFirst	60
NPCC	38
WECC	231
TexasRE	31
MRO	58
SERC	118

BACKGROUND LARGE LOADS WORKING GROUP (LLWG)

Develop load models

Identify metering & protection changes

Assess impact on resource adequacy

Collect data to identify unique characteristics

Improve planning process for integrating Large Loads

Classification of different Large Loads

Identify processes & standards that do not fully address risk of emerging Large Loads

Whitepaper 1:
Characteristics and Risks of
Emerging Large Loads

Whitepaper 2:
Assessment of Gaps in Existing Practices,
Requirements, and Reliability Standards for
Emerging Large Loads

Whitepaper 3:
Reliability Guideline Risk Mitigation for
Emerging Large Loads

DATA CENTERS & LARGE LOADS

Large Loads Action Plan

Q3 2026

- Host a webinar on the Level 3 Alert (July 8)
- Publish the Data Center Load Modeling Technical Reference (July, subject to RSTC approval)
- Responses Due: Level 3 Alert (August 3)
- Post glossary and standard(s) for comments (August)
- Organize a Data Center Load Modeling Workshop (September 15–16)

Q4 2026

- Post registry criteria, glossary, and standard(s) for additional comment period (October 21 if needed)
- Request Board approval of registry criteria, glossary, and standard(s) (December 25)
- File registry criteria, glossary, and standard(s) (December 31, subject to Board approval)

Q1–Q4 2027

- Draft and file additional applicable Reliability Standards as needed


NERC

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Level 3 Essential Action Alert

- Highest level of alert that NERC releases-only for actions that are deemed "essential" for BPS reliability
- Issued as NERC observed customer-initiated large load reductions and significant oscillations that occur in seconds...threatening BPS reliability
- Outlines action registered entities must implement to address immediate risks posed by computational loads interfacing with the BPS

MODERNIZATION OF STANDARDS



MODERNIZATION OF STANDARDS

IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE


QUARTERLY WORKSTREAM PROGRESSION 2026-2027

	Q2 2026	Q3 2026	Q4 2026	Q1 2027	Q2 2027	Q3 2027
 GOVERNANCE	 Draft ROP revisions  Post ROP for informal comment period  Hold industry workshop to gather feedback on ROP revisions	 SC to approve SPM posting  Post ROP changes and charter revisions for formal 60-day comment period	 Respond to formal posting comments  Prepare Board presentation	 Board to adopt revised ROP  Begin implementation  Set up subcommittee and launch SME Pool	 Initiate MSPP standards process	 Hold first workshop with new RISC subcommittee
 PILOT	 Form Short-Term Advisory Group  Create Standards Initiation Request and Term Sheet templates	 Identify additional projects and pilots as SARs are submitted	 Phase 1 Computational Loads filed – disband advisory group			

NERC

MODERNIZATION OF STANDARDS

2026-2027 GOVERNANCE TIMELINE



NATURAL GAS-ELECTRIC COORDINATION

NERC Reliability Insights article

Gas-Electric System Interdependence

Growing reliance on natural gas generation creates new reliability risks due to system interdependence and supply disruptions.

Vulnerabilities in Gas Transportation


Limited firm transportation and reliance on interruptible contracts increase outage risks during peak demand or extreme weather.

Coordination and Communication

Improved communication among operators and real-time information sharing enhance situational awareness and risk mitigation.

Fuel Assurance and Planning

Evaluating fuel strategies and incorporating gas risks into planning improves reliability during disruptions and extreme conditions.




NATURAL GAS-ELECTRIC COORDINATION

January 2026



NERC Comments on FERC NOPR

- NERC submitted comments on the FERC 2025 NOPR
- The comments supported the proposed incorporation by reference of the North American Energy Standards Board's (NAESB) Standard for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines



- ERO 3 Step Strategy: Identify the Risk, Assess and Prioritize the Risk, & Mitigate and Remediate the Risk
- Identified risks include supply and transportation, market harmonization, resource adequacy and ramping, & winterization

Electricity-Natural Gas Strategy

August 2025

RELIABILITY IS A JOURNEY, not a destination

It's not as easy as 1-2-3,
but we want to help you!

A large white number '1' centered on a solid red rectangular background.A large white number '2' centered on a solid yellow rectangular background.A large white number '3' centered on a solid teal rectangular background.

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Diane Holder

diane.holder@rfirst.org



ReliabilityFirst Introduction

Michelle Cross

August 18, 2026

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ASK QUESTIONS

Join the conversation at

[SLIDO.com](https://www.slido.com)

[#RFBootcamp](https://twitter.com/RFBootcamp)



THE ERO AND RELIABILITYFIRST



Our mission is to ensure the reliability and security of the bulk power system



We are an objective and independent resource




We, along with the other regional entities & NERC, make up the ERO Enterprise



We are regulators of the electric industry



We do not own or operate grid assets or energy markets



13

Number of States and DC

73M

Estimated Population

350+

Registered Entities

ELECTRIC RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION GOVERNANCE MODEL



Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission



North American Electric
Reliability Corporation



ReliabilityFirst

History

- 2003 - US-Canada Blackout affecting over 50 million people for up to 4 days.
- 2005 - The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the creation of an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO).
- 2006 - The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) certified NERC as the ERO.
- 2006 - ReliabilityFirst was created as a NERC regional Entity
- 2007 - Compliance with approved NERC Reliability Standards became mandatory and enforceable in the United States

ERO ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITIES

NERC

Standards Development	Assessments	Studies	White Papers
More than 90 Reliability Standards	Long-Term and Seasonal	Risk Reliability Studies, Transfer Capability	Technical White Papers and Reports

As the ERO, NERC develops and enforces mandatory Standards, assesses current and future reliability trends, analyzes system events, and recommends improved practices. NERC maintains several technical committees which assist in the development of standards and grid assessments. NERC has oversight of the six regions and evaluating reliability risk on an international scale.

Regions

Audits	Enforcement	Outreach	Regional Assessments & Studies
In-the-Field and On-site Verification of Compliance	Penalties for Non-Compliance	Training, Webinars, Workshops, Newsletters	Regional Reliability Assessments and Event Analysis

The Regions have the authority to audit and enforce entities against the NERC Reliability Standards. They also provide region-specific studies and assessments as well as outreach and training.

ERO JURISDICTIONS

FEDERAL POWER ACT

01 Section 215(c)

Section 215(c) states that the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) has the ability to **develop and enforce, reliability standards** that provide an adequate level of reliability of the bulk power system

02 Section 215(g)

Section 215(g) requires that the ERO conduct periodic **assessments of the reliability and adequacy** of the bulk power system.

03 Section 215(i)


Section 215(i) states that the ERO **does not** have the authority to set or enforce mandatory standards for **adequacy or safety** of electric facilities or services.

04 Statute

The statute makes clear that the ERO **does not** have the authority to require the **construction** of generation or transmission assets.

ENERGY TRILEMMA CONSIDERATIONS

Reliability



Environment Cost



RELIABILITY

-  Resource Adequacy and Fuel Assurance
-  Essential Reliability Services
 - Voltage
 - Frequency Response
 - Inertia and Short-Circuit
-  Blackstart Resources
-  Transfer Capabilities
-  Distributed Energy Resources
-  Energy Efficiency and Demand Response



COST


-  Affordability and Energy Equity
-  Supply Chain Considerations
-  Net Energy Efficiency
-  Impact on Economy
-  Job Growth (short-term and long-term)
-  Life-expectancy of new resources



ENVIRONMENT / SUSTAINABILITY

-  Land / Water usage
-  Carbon and Emissions
-  Siting and Permitting
-  Wildlife and deforestation
-  Recycling and Decommissioning
-  Renewable Resources

RESOURCE ADEQUACY: NERC 2025 LTRA




RESOURCE ADEQUACY: NERC 2025 LTRA

PJM Focus



- Current projections for resource additions do not keep pace with escalating demand forecasts and expected generator retirements
- The anticipated resource margin falls below the Reference Margin Level starting in 2029
- Recently approved new generation projects for expedited interconnection under the PJM Reliability Resource Initiative were not far enough along to include in the LTRA risk analysis




RESOURCE ADEQUACY: NERC 2025 LTRA

MISO Focus




- Current projections for resource additions do not keep pace with escalating demand forecasts and expected generator retirements
- The anticipated resource margin falls below the Reference Margin Level starting in 2028
- Recently approved new generation projects for accelerated interconnection under the MISO Expedited Resource Addition Study (ERAS) were not far enough along to include in the LTRA risk analysis




EXISTING GENERATION CAPACITY

PJM Summer Capacity (MW)



MISO Summer Capacity (MW)



ESSENTIAL RELIABILITY SERVICES

							
	Frequency Response	Voltage Control	Dispatchable for Ramping	On-site Fuel Availability	Fast Start-up <30 minutes	Availability on and off peak	Blackstart Capability
Biomass							
Hydro							
Natural Gas - CT							
Oil - Steam							
Coal - Steam							
Oil/Diesel - CT							
Nuclear							
Solar							
Battery							
Solar + Battery							
Wind On-Shore							
Wind Off-Shore							



Does Not Exhibit Attribute




Partially Exhibits Attribute



Exhibits Attribute


PJM Actual Load



DISPATCHABILITY


Fuel Mix - PJM

PJM Actual Generation



LOAD GROWTH FORECAST


PJM Load Forecast



Load Forecast Range


MISO Annual Coincident Peak Demand Forecast with Total Percent Change

from 2024 MISO Long-Term Load Forecast Whitepaper




EIA GENERATION PLANNED


MISO MW of Generation Planned



PJM MW of Generation Planned



Source: EIA 860M data



Scan for full
report


Executive Summary

- The RF region is at **high risk for shortfalls** as we approach end of the decade (PJM and MISO areas).
- Key drivers impacting our current and future resource mix are policy decisions, supply chain disruptions, economic conditions, and availability of skilled labor
- Our **challenges are compounded** by additional risks such as environmental factors (extreme weather), volatile (but rapidly increasing) load forecasts, along with grid security challenges
- Key findings underscore the need for proactive, coordinated action among policy makers, utilities, and stakeholders to **ensure infrastructure development keeps pace with reliability requirements**

WHAT'S ON OUR BOOKSHELF?



Scan for
[full report](#)





QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Michelle Cross

Michelle.cross@rfirst.org

MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF NERC STANDARDS


Kristen Senk, Deputy General Counsel, ReliabilityFirst

Cleveland, August 18, 2026



RF MISSION

- ***Preserve and enhance the reliability and security of the bulk power system in our footprint.***
- RF uses multiple tools to accomplish our mission, including:



Audits	Enforcement	Outreach	Regional Assessments & Studies
In-the-Field and On-site Verification of Compliance	Penalties for Non-Compliance	Training, Webinars, Workshops, Newsletters	Regional Reliability Assessments and Event Analysis

REGISTERED ENTITIES

- All owners, users and operators who have a material impact on the Bulk Power System must register as “Registered Entities”
- Registered under one or more Function Type(s)
- Registered functions determine Standards applicability
- Current Registered Entities: 384

Function Type

- Reliability Coordinator (RC)
- Transmission Operator (TOP)
- Balancing Authority (BA)
- Planning Authority/Coordinator (PA/PC)
- Transmission Planner (TP)
- Transmission Service Provider (TSP)
- Transmission Owner (TO)
- Resource Planner (RP)
- Distribution Provider (DP)
- Distribution Provider UFLS (DP-UFLS)
- Generator Owner (GO-1) (Category 1)
- Generator Owner (GO-2) (Category 2)
- Generator Operator (GOP-1) (Category 1)
- Generator Operator (GOP-2) (Category 2)
- Reserve Sharing Group (RSG)
- Frequency Response Sharing Group (FRSG)
- Regulation Reserve Sharing Group (RRSG)

RELIABILITY STANDARDS

Operations and Planning (OPS)

- Resource and Demand Balancing (BAL)
- Communication (COM)
- Emergency Preparedness and Operations (EOP)
- Facilities Design, Connections and Maintenance (FAC)
- Interchange Scheduling and Coordination (INT)
- Modeling, Data, Analytics (MOD)
- Nuclear (NUC)
- Personnel Performance, Training and Qualifications (PER)
- Protection and Control (PRC)
- Transmission Operations (TOP)
- Transmission Planning (TPL)
- Voltage and Reactive (VAR)




Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

- Cyber System Categorization (CIP-002)
- Security Management Controls (CIP-003)
- Personnel & Training (CIP-004)
- Electronic Security Perimeter (CIP-005)
- Physical Security (CIP-006)
- System Security Management (CIP-007)
- Incident Reporting & Response Planning (CIP-008)
- Recovery Plans (CIP-009)
- Change & Vulnerability Management (CIP-010)
- Information Protection (CIP-011)
- Communications between Control Centers (CIP-012)
- Supply Chain Risk Management (CIP-013)
- Physical Security (CIP-014)
- Internal Network Security Monitoring (CIP-015)



RISK-BASED COMPLIANCE MONITORING

Considerations for Scheduling



Types of Engagements

Audit

Spot Check

Self-Certification

Compliance Investigation

ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW

- High Volume Enforcement Work
 - Intake average of 425 violations per year (472 in 2025)
 - Process average 450 per year (489 in 2025)
- Discovery Methods
 - Self-Report: Entity identifies noncompliance on its own and reports it to the Region (most common discovery method - ~85%)
 - Monitoring (e.g. audits): Region identifies noncompliance through monitoring activity
- Risk-Based Enforcement
 - Focus resources on violations posing higher risk to grid; streamline minimal risk issues
 - Monetary penalties in ~5% of cases (can also issue non-monetary penalties tied to risk)

ENFORCEMENT PHILOSOPHY

A balanced approach that strengthens reliability, rewards improvement, and applies enforcement to reduce future risk.

Core message: reliability and continuous improvement

1

Mitigation focus

Encourage meaningful steps that remediate risk and prevent recurrence

2

Incent continuous improvement

Credit self-identification, transparency, and strong compliance programs

3

Deter undesired conduct

Use proportionate penalties to discourage repeat violations and significant risk

4

Reliability lens

Prioritize outcomes that strengthen dependable operations and public confidence.

Enforcement as a reliability tool, not merely a penalty mechanism

VIOLATION TRENDS

High Priorities (High Risk)

Facility Ratings

Vegetation Management

Protection System Settings/Coordination


Cyber Security (sensitive information management;
systems access control; access management)

Physical Security (protecting critical assets; physical
security incidents)


Operating Instructions

Voltage Control


Top 3 Most Violated Ops and Planning Requirements (12 Months)



Top 3 Most Violated CIP Requirements (12 Months)



ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES



FORWARD TOGETHER RELIABILITYFIRST

SUMMARY - ENFORCEMENT DATA

The following slides include enforcement data relating to some key enforcement metrics that ReliabilityFirst tracks.

The data shows that violation intake remains high. The overwhelming majority of violations were self-reported or self-logged as opposed to identified through a compliance monitoring engagement. Regarding violations processed (i.e., filed with NERC) between January 1, 2025, and April 8, 2025, most were lower risk violations. The team expects to process over 420 violations by year end. There is a slide summarizing ReliabilityFirst's violation inventory. Most of the cases are considered relatively new, with 57% identified in 2024 and 2025, 33% identified in 2023, 9% identified in 2022, and only 1% identified in 2021.

The last slide includes intake commentary (e.g., examples of the types of conduct at issue) for CIP-004-7 R5, CIP-003-8 R2, CIP-007-6 R2, and FAC-008-5 R6 violations based on recent intake (i.e., cases that were reported between December 2024 and present). Similar commentary was provided in the Reference Materials from the August 21, 2024, and December 4, 2024, Risk and Compliance Committee Meetings.

Public

FORWARD TOGETHER RELIABILITYFIRST

INTAKE COMMENTARY

Standard and Requirement	Summary of Requirement	Intake Volume	Examples of Issues/Comments
CIP-004-7 R5	Access revocation	15	• Delinquent revocation of physical and electronic access for employees and contractors
CIP-003-8 R2	Security Management Controls (Low Impact Bulk Electric System Cyber Systems)	8	• Most instances focus on Cyber Security Incident Response Plans (CSIRP), including plan adequacy and plan testing ²
CIP-007-6 R2	Security patch management	5	• Instances reflect failures to identify patch sources, untimely patch evaluation, and untimely patch applications
FAC-008-5 R6	Establish Facility Ratings consistent with Facility Ratings methodology	5	• Facility Rating accuracy is critical to modeling, analysis, planning, operations, and relaying, and Facility Ratings continue to be an area of focus ³

1 - CIP-010-4 R1 and CIP-004-7 R4 violation intake remain high. Please refer to Reference Materials from the August 21, 2024, Risk and Compliance Meeting for intake commentary specific to these Standards/Requirements, which is still pertinent today.

2 - Please refer to Reference Materials from the December 4, 2024, Risk and Compliance Meeting for additional intake commentary specific to CIP-003-8 R2, which is still pertinent today. The current commentary reflects a shift in reported issues to focus on CSIRP creation and testing.

3 - Please refer to the 2025 ERO Enterprise Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program Implementation Plan: <https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/CAOneStopShop/ERO%20CMEP%20Implementation%20Plan%20v2.0%202025.pdf>

Public

Enforcement Explained: Trends in vegetation management



By **Max Reisinger**, Senior Counsel, Legal & Enforcement

In this column, ReliabilityFirst Enforcement Staff share information on a variety of topics with a focus on communicating risk and providing transparency into the enforcement process. This includes: (a) identification of concerning violation trends, common failure types, and suggested solutions; (b) communication of expectations; and (c) commentary on enforcement approaches and specific factors that may affect the outcome in any given case. If you want to learn more about any of the topics discussed herein, please reach out to the author or your case manager.





QUESTIONS & ANSWERS


MONITORING SYSTEM EVENTS AND OPS-X DEMONSTRATION

Brian Thiry
Director, Strategic Engagement

THE ELECTRIC GRID



Is the grid **reliable**?



Is the grid **resilient**?



Is the grid **secure**?



Is the grid **clean/sustainable**?



Is the grid **affordable**?



Is the grid **scalable**?

ERO RISK FRAMEWORK



RISK IDENTIFICATION




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Electric
Reliability
Corporation

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Rules of Procedure

Effective: November 28, 2023



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THINKING ABOUT SYSTEMS EVENTS

events



- Disturbance; an unplanned, abnormal condition on the grid

Events

- Occurrence that meets the criteria of NERC Standard EOP-004, Department of Energy OE-417, CIP-008, or NERC's Event Analysis Process (i.e., categorized event)

EVENTS

- Major blackouts, load shed events (i.e., things that will be on the news)



Disclaimer: these definitions are of the presenter and not official NERC Glossary terminology

EVENT DATA AND REPORTS

NERC

2026 State of Reliability

Technical Assessment of 2025 Bulk Power System Performance

June 24, 2026

2026 SOR Snapshot

2026 SOR Overview

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

POWERING TODAY. PROTECTING TOMORROW.









Table 2.4: Top Transmission Initiating Outage Causes on Extreme Days Ranked by MVA Capacity

Area	Cause #1	Cause #2	Cause #3	Cause #4	Cause #5
All NERC Regional Entities	Weather (Excluding Lightning)	Failed AC Substation Equipment	Unknown	Power System Condition	Contamination
	156,789	31,586	31,515	28,585	23,963
Eastern-Québec Interconnections	Weather (Excluding Lightning)	Failed AC Substation Equipment	Lightning	Human Error	Failed AC Circuit Equipment
	142,446	35,696	24,057	19,268	15,094
Texas Interconnection	Weather (Excluding Lightning)	Failed AC Substation Equipment	Lightning	Power System Condition	Unknown
	18,052	10,536	6,993	4,911	4,315
Western Interconnection	Weather (Excluding Lightning)	Unknown	Fire	Power System Condition	Other
	49,701	39,187	37,074	30,008	20,165


<https://www.nerc.com/our-work/reports/state-of-reliability>





SECURITY EVENTS

- Stuxnet (2010)
- Ukraine Grid Attack (2015)
- NotPeyta (2017)
- SolarWinds (2020)
- Colonial Pipeline Ransomware (2021)




OUR RESPONSE

Compliance and Coordination



New/Revised Standards, New Registrations, and NERC Alerts

- Winterization
- Ride-Through Settings
- Physical Security
- Virtualization, Cloud, Supply Chain
- IBR Category 2
- Computational Load Owners/Operators (coming soon)




Outreach, Training, and Education


- Guidelines, White Papers, Newsletters, Bulletins
- Cold Weather Winterization (CWW) Visits
- Industry Assist Visits and Tabletops
- Workshops, Webinars (*Tech Talk with RF*), and the Fall Summit
- **State Outreach**
 - Hearings, Testimonies, Written Remarks, 1:1 Meetings, Panel Discussions, Briefings



HIGH RISK TIMES





<https://emergencyprocedures.pjm.com/ep/pages/dashboard.jsf>



AUGUST 2025 BALTIMORE LOAD SHED EVENT

RF RELIABILITY FIRST
AFTER ACTION ANALYSIS
October 2025



Incident Review

Primary Takeaways

In recent years, shoulder stresses have become increasingly challenging for bulk power system (BPS) operators to manage. This review led to a total of 6 incidents over a 13-month period that resulted in pre-contingent load shedding. All these load-shed incidents had similar contributing circumstances: All incidents occurred during what is commonly known as the "shoulder seasons" and had unplanned generation that was either planned or unplanned, unavailable transmission that was either planned or unplanned, and more than forecasted load shed in all cases. Because of real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) results that indicated significant issues related to the next loss of a transmission element. These issues would have involved either significant overloads that could lead to cascading or significantly low voltages bordering on voltage instability.

During RTCA, which is important for operating the power system, analysis is performed on the system's current operating state. This differs from operational planning analysis (OPA), which studies the system for forecasted operating conditions. Very often, the real-time operating conditions are different than the forecasted operating conditions.

RTCA is the safety net used to ensure that the system is operating in a secure state in its current configuration and loading levels. Planned and unplanned outages, variable energy resources (VER), and variable weather conditions leading to variations in load can drive real-time conditions that necessitate load shed to maintain BPS reliability.

Background

Shoulder seasons are the spring and fall periods that are between the summer and winter peak load periods. These seasons have historically been used for planned BPS maintenance and construction in preparation for the upcoming peak load season. For instance, generating resources require periodic maintenance to ensure their availability during peak seasons. This periodic maintenance requires an outage of the generating facility. Market forces and other economic incentives have caused generating plant maintenance outages to be shifted into the shoulder seasons, leading to increasing numbers of generators being out of service for maintenance simultaneously. Additionally, transmission lines require periodic maintenance, such as insulator, crossarm, or structure replacement, leading to planned outages during shoulder seasons.

Furthermore, the BPS is in a cycle of growth and transition, and significant new transmission development is occurring. To facilitate the construction of new transmission facilities, outages on existing BPS transmission facilities are required. This work is also concentrated in the shoulder seasons.


Historically, BPS reserve margins have been sufficient for the shoulder seasons to accommodate these outages without much difficulty, but reserve margins have shrunk in recent years. In its 2024–2025 *Winter Reliability Assessment*,¹ NERC identified significant reductions in thermal generation from the previous winter. In many instances, this thermal generation has been replaced by VERs, such as wind and solar. However, VERs present

¹ https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/programs/rapa/ra/nerc_wra_2024.pdf

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

POWERING TODAY. PROTECTING TOMORROW.

OPS-X GRID SIMULATOR



QUESTIONS & ANSWERS



ENGINEERING ASSESSMENTS - MODELING, ANALYSIS, AND ENERGY ASSESSMENTS

Johnny Gest

Manager, Engineering & System Performance

ReliabilityFirst Electric Grid Bootcamp

08-18-2026



AGENDA

ELECTRIC GRID OVERVIEW

PLANNING CASES, MODELS, AND STUDIES

RESOURCE ADEQUACY


ENERGY ASSESSMENTS

DEMAND-SIDE CONSIDERATION

SOLUTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

THE ELECTRIC GRID

From Power Generation to End Users



Reliable

Delivering power when it's needed.



Resilient

Withstanding storms, faults, and disruptions.



Efficient

Operating the grid safely and economically.



Sustainable

Integrating clean energy for the future.

Planning Cases, Models, and Studies

Transmission Planning Analysis



WHAT CAN GO WRONG?

Reliability studies intentionally ask how the grid performs after equipment becomes unavailable, not just during normal conditions.

Equipment outages: Lines, Transformers, Generators

Loss of a key path or resources can force power onto remaining lines and create overload risk and reduce operating flexibility.


More severe events

Study combinations or higher-impact scenarios to identify vulnerabilities and mitigation needs.

Planning Value

System model and study results help determine whether operating procedures, upgrades, or other mitigation measures are needed.

Planning studies utilize criteria in NERC Reliability Standard TPL-001



CASE AND MODEL APPLICATION

Case is a “digital twin” that tests whether the grid can reliably move electricity from supply to demand.

1. Inputs/Models

Generation, demand, transmission facilities (e.g., lines, transformers, etc.), facility ratings, voltage limits, and system assumptions.




2. Case Run

Simulate how power moves across the network under various operating conditions and outages.



3. Results

The simulation results identify overloaded facilities, voltage concerns, transfer limits, and potential system events.



SERVING GROWING DEMAND



Power-flow analysis converts growth assumptions into physical grid impacts. Improper planning may delay regional economic growth.

Can the grid serve new load?

Transmission planners test whether facilities can carry projected demand without exceeding reliability limits.

Computational load impacts

Data centers, manufacturing, and electrification can concentrate demand in locations where the grid was not originally designed for that scale.

Concerns turn to action

Modeled overloads or voltage concerns indicate where upgrades, and timing issues require attention.

Why it matters

Reliability risk can constrain economic development if infrastructure cannot keep pace with demand growth.

MAKING GENERATION DELIVERABLE

The question is not just “how much supply?” – it is “can it reach load?”



Generation location matters

New resources may be far from the customers or load centers they are intended to serve.



Transmission paths matter

The model identifies whether existing lines and transformers can support the expected flows.



Constraints matter

A bottleneck can limit deliverability even when enough generation exists in the region. It can also restrict dispatch of lower cost resources.



Timing matters

Generation additions and transmission reinforcements may not move on the same schedule.

Deliverability impacts operational limitation, cost to connect, interconnection timing, and local reliability.



TRANSMISSION EXPANSION

Planning, permitting, siting, cost allocation, and construction add complexity before electrons can move



1 Need identified

Simulation flags a reliability or deliverability issue.



2 Options studied

Planners validate initial results, identify mitigations, find best overall solution.



3 Approvals aligned

Design, siting, permitting, and equipment procurement.



4 Facilities built

Scheduled outages, construction, testing or commissioning are sequenced.

Power-flow studies can identify the need early, but physical transmission solutions require multi-step coordination

WHY ACCURACY MATTERS

Accurate Facility Ratings

- Define the operating limits of the transmission system
- Avoid overstating or understating facility capability
- Improve confidence in planning and operational decisions

Accurate Models

- Reflect real-world behavior of transmission, generation, and load
- Capture impacts of emerging technologies and changing grid characteristics
- Improve identification of reliability risks and effective mitigations

Sound Study Assumptions

- Establish a credible foundation for study results
- Address uncertainty through scenarios and sensitivities



PLANNING STUDIES - TAKEAWAYS

- Cases are a “digital twin” of the electric grid using complex models to replicate transmission element operational behavior
- Studies simulate various outages, reroute the power, and identify potential reliability concerns
- Study focus is typically reviewing impacts of **new generation** connections or **demand growth**
- Development of transmission and generation infrastructure takes times to implement
- Study errors can result in:
 - Insufficient time to implement needed solutions
 - Failure to identify potential reliability concerns



Resource Adequacy

Is there enough resource capacity to meet peak demand while experiencing resource unavailability?



NAMEPLATE, CAPACITY, & ENERGY

Installed generation tells only part of the reliability story. Resource adequacy focuses on resource capacity during the peak hour.



Generator nameplate

Designed megawatt output of the unit



Installed capacity

Megawatt output that can be produced at a defined moment



Available energy


Megawatts produced over a defined set of time.




Why does it matter?

A system may appear adequate by nameplate or capacity values but still face risk if fuel, weather, outages, or transfers limit energy availability

PJM Existing, Planned, and Potential Renewable Summer Capacity vs. Nameplate



MISO Existing, Planned, and Potential Renewable Capacity vs. Nameplate



Source: ReliabilityFirst 2026 Resource Adequacy Report
<https://feature.rfirst.org/resource-adequacy-report-2026/index.html>

BALANCING RESOURCES & DEMAND

Key question: Do we have enough resources to keep the lights on in the future?



Applicable Risks

- 1) Resource retirements outpace resource additions**
- 2) Demand outpaces resource additions**


Are policy, market, permitting, and interconnection paths aligned so replacement resources arrive before shortages occur?

RESOURCE MARGINS

Reserve Margin

- Amount resource capacity that exceeds demand


How much of a buffer does my area have?



Reference Margin

- Represents acceptable level of risk for resource planning

Is my buffer sufficient?



RESOURCE ADEQUACY - TAKEAWAYS

Results are constantly in flux: Pace of change in resource additions and retirements plus demand forecasts

- Resources are represented based on output profile impacted by outages, weather, and fuel availability
- Important to plan for resources to be greater than demand **AND** the reserve margin
- Reduce uncertainty with accurate forecasting
 - Can generation be built in-time?
 - Will load develop as forecasted?
- Reliable portfolio considers how resources perform together during high-risk periods
- Measures like Demand Response can be used to balance resource shortfalls



Energy Assessments

Is there enough energy to supply demand through sustained events?



WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

A system may have adequate reserve margins but still face risks if fuel, weather, outages, or transfers limit sustained energy availability.

Energy shortfall risk is shifting away from peak conditions

Extreme weather can impact renewable output, thermal plant performance, and increase risk of transmission outages

Operational complexity increases with flexible demand, fuel storage coordination, and optimizing battery dispatch

Wide-area events can impact ability to deliver energy between regions



DATA UTILIZED

Model

- “Pipe and bubble” – Not as complex as planning or operational models

Demand Inputs

- Forecasted hourly load profiles
- Demand Response assumptions

Transmission Inputs

- Transfer capabilities between areas
- Import/export assumptions

Weather Inputs

- Historical weather and temperatures

Resource Inputs

- Resource nameplate and operating characteristics
- Forced outage rates and maintenance schedules
- Renewable resource profiles (i.e., hydro, solar, and wind)
- Energy Storage nameplate, duration, and dispatch assumptions

Operational Inputs

- Reserve requirements
- Ramp rate and minimum run times
- Seasonal and extreme operating assumptions

PROBABILISTIC RISK METRICS



Loss of Load Expectation LOLE

How often?

Expected number of days in a year when supply could fall short at least once. It is a frequency metric. Common shorthand: 0.1 days/year, often described as "1 day in 10 years."



Loss of Load Hours LOLH

How long?

Expected number of hours in a year when demand could exceed available supply. It gives a more detailed view than counting days, because it looks hour by hour.




Expected Unserved Energy EUE

How big is the impact?

Expected amount of energy customers would not receive during shortage events, usually shown in MWh or GWh. It captures severity, not just occurrence.

No Perfect Metric

- No single metric tells the whole story.
- LOLE shows frequency, LOLH shows duration, and EUE shows severity.
- Together, they give a clearer picture of reliability risk and the types of solutions that may be needed.



Demand-Side Considerations

How behind-the-meter elements impact the transmission grid



PRACTICAL EXAMPLE - DUCK CURVE

Demand-Side Management (DSM)


Long-term programs and policies that encourage customers to reduce overall energy consumption or shift electricity use to lower-demand periods.

Demand Response (DR)

Programs that provide financial incentives for customers to temporarily reduce or increase electricity use in response to grid conditions, reliability needs, or price signals.

Energy Efficiency

Permanent improvements to equipment, technology, or processes that reduce energy consumption while delivering the same level of service or output.



A graphical representation of the 'Duck Curve' for the SWIS, created with 2020 data from [AEMO](#).

Solutions for Consideration

What can be implemented to alleviate identified resource and energy shortfalls?



SOLUTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

- Accept the identified risks during extreme events (assuming other reliability thresholds are met)
- Construct local generation
- Increase Demand Response
- Increase transfer capability to neighbors with surplus resources
 - Transmission infrastructure upgrades
 - Remedial action schemes (RAS)



Grid-enhancing Technologies (GETs)


QUESTIONS & ANSWERS



Johnny Gest

johnny.gest@rfirst.org





RF ELECTRIC GRID BOOTCAMP

Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) Overview

How RTOs run the bulk power grid — with a focus on MISO and PJM

August 2026

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Today's participants will:

- Understand the footprint and challenges of each RTO.
- Identify the similarities and differences between MISO and PJM RTOs.
- Apply concepts to understand potential policy positions.
- Compare and contrast the operational and market structures of MISO and PJM using real-world examples.
- Understand RTO interconnection/queue challenges.



FOUNDATIONS

What is an RTO?

- Non-profit, public-benefit entities that coordinate, control and monitor a multi-state electric grid.
- Because interstate power flow is interstate commerce, RTOs answer to FERC — not to state utility commissions — under a FERC-approved tariff.
- Roots: FERC Orders 888/889 (1996) opened non-discriminatory transmission access; Order 2000 (Dec. 1999) encouraged voluntary RTO formation and set 12 required functions.
- Membership is voluntary; the mission is economic efficiency, reliability and non-discriminatory access.


~ 2/3

of U.S. electricity demand is
served by RTOs / ISOs

Order 2000 (1999)

Defined the twelve characteristics and functions an entity must meet to operate as a Regional Transmission Organization.

Regional Transmission Organizations in the United States



GEOGRAPHY

RTO and ReliabilityFirst footprints


Seven RTOs / ISOs in the U.S.

PJM • MISO • SPP • CAISO • ISO-NE • NYISO • ERCOT

Six fall under FERC jurisdiction; ERCOT operates outside it. Together they serve roughly two-thirds of U.S. electricity consumers.

ReliabilityFirst (RF)


- One of six NERC Regional Entities (with MRO, NPCC, SERC, Texas RE and WECC) that enforce Bulk Electric System reliability.
- Regulates BOTH PJM and MISO within its footprint; based in Cleveland, spanning the Great Lakes and Mid-Atlantic.
- Began operations in 2006, covering all or parts of 13 states plus D.C.



DAY TO DAY

What RTOs do every day

- 1 Run the markets** Operate day-ahead and real-time energy markets plus ancillary services.
- 2 Dispatch economically** Match supply and demand in real time, dispatching generation at least cost.
- 3 Keep the lights on** Maintain bulk-system reliability and open, non-discriminatory transmission access.
- 4 Plan the grid** Conduct regional transmission planning and coordinate system expansion.
- 5 Coordinate at the seam** MISO and PJM settle across their border via the Joint & Common Market.



COMPARISON

How MISO and PJM compare

MISO

- Spans a north-south footprint across the Midwest and South.
- Serves 45M+ people across 15 states and part of Canada
- Mostly regulated and vertically integrated utilities
- Annual capacity markets for 5% of load

PJM

- Mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes regions
- The largest U.S. RTO — serves 67M+ people across 13 states and D.C.
- More deregulated utilities
- Conduct 3-year capacity auctions with ~ 95% of load

Common ground: both operate under ReliabilityFirst and coordinate at their shared seam via the Joint & Common Market.

RELIABILITY

NERC registration roles

NERC is the FERC-certified Electric Reliability Organization. It registers owners, operators and users of the Bulk Electric System by function.

RC

Reliability Coordinator

BA

Balancing Authority

TOP

Transmission Operator

TO

Transmission Owner

TP

Transmission Planner

PC

Planning Coordinator

GO

Generator Owner

GOP

Generator Operator

Certification-required roles in amber must complete formal certification and meet minimum performance criteria before they may operate.

JURISDICTION

Where states still hold the pen

Approve the resource mix

In regulated markets, vertically integrated utilities choose generation with public utility commission (PUC) approval.

Regulate retail service

States keep authority over retail rates and retail-choice — wholesale market rules are set by FERC tariff.

Site the lines

Transmission line siting and permitting remain largely a state function.


Consult on cost allocation

Order 1920-A (Nov. 2024) requires state consultation before amending any long-term regional cost-allocation method.

GOVERNANCE

How stakeholder processes work

RTOs develop market rules through open, member-driven governance — keeping the process competitive and access non-discriminatory.



Fast lane: PJM's board can invoke a Critical Issue Fast Path (CIFP) under Manual 34 to accelerate urgent proposals, while MISO expedites specific filings less formally.

PLANNING MODELS

Regulated vs. deregulated planning

REGULATED

Integrated Resource Planning

- Vertically integrated utilities plan generation as a regulated monopoly.
- An Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) maps long-term, least-cost supply.
- State PUCs review and comment/approve the plan.
- Utility bears the build-or-buy decision and cost recovery.
- Most common in MISO.

DEREGULATED

Market-Based Additions

- Generation is competitive and unbundled from the wires business.
- Developers sell energy and capacity into RTO markets.
- Resource additions are market-driven, not utility-planned.
- Capacity and energy prices — not an IRP — signal where and when to build.
- Most common in PJM.

THE PRESSURE POINT

Resource adequacy challenges

Retiring generation, slow interconnection and surging demand are squeezing reserve margins — putting resource adequacy at the center of every RTO's agenda.

June 2025

FERC steps in

Commissioner-led technical conference (Docket AD25-7) examined resource-adequacy constructs and the role of capacity markets.

2026/27

MISO's warning

Sufficient across all four seasons, but MISO cautions that near-term shortfalls loom if retirements outpace faster resource additions.

2026+

Proactive steps are underway

FERC held a PJM Governance reform conference and demanded reforms by Sept 2026.

FERC ordered NERC to develop new reliability standards for large loads by Dec 2026

INTERCONNECTION

Queue status: MISO and PJM

MISO

- Queue reforms since 2023 to clear the backlog.
- Expedited Resource Addition Study (ERAS) runs alongside the cycle to relieve the most urgent reliability needs.

TRACK IT

- Current Queue Activity interactive map
- GI Interactive Queue spreadsheet (downloadable)
- [Generator Interconnection Queue](#)

PJM

- Historically shorter process than MISO
- Annual, cluster-based cycle.
- New-generation timelines run 36–60 months.
- Created Reliability Resource Initiative (RRI) final agreements late 2026.

TRACK IT

- Cycle Service Request Status page (exportable list)
- Interconnection media update, May 2026
- [PJM - Interconnection / Upgrade Requests](#)

MISO FAST-TRACK

Expedited Resource Addition Studies (ERAS)

A temporary MISO process that fast-tracks the study and approval of interconnection projects needed for resource adequacy and reliability.

Mar. 17, 2025

Final proposal filed at FERC (effective ~May 17, 2025)

Aug. 6, 2025

Applications open; projects studied serially each quarter

Sunset



Ends at the 68th ERAS project or Aug. 31, 2027

Strict eligibility

- ✓ 100% site control demonstrated
- ✓ RERRA (state regulator) notification
- ✓ Executed off-take agreement in hand
- ✓ Non-refundable \$100,000 entry fee


The high bar keeps the fast path reserved for shovel-ready projects that relieve genuine reliability needs.

June 2026 status report

**487***CP Nodes Waiting***87,080***MW Waiting***286***CP Nodes Delayed***43,702***MW Delayed*

Waiting generation is expected to come on-line following the original forecasted date. Delayed generation is a subset of waiting generation for which the asset owner reported a delay.

Expected COD by Year (MW)




Commercial
Operations Date
(C.O.D.) forecast




Regional and state views



Average Number of Days Delayed




Number of MW Delayed




State comparisons




Waiting Generation (MW)




Delayed Generation (MW)




Average Days of Delay



Breakdown by state



MISO active projects



[GI Interactive Queue](#)

PJM FAST-TRACK

Reliability Resource Initiative (RRI)

A one-time PJM program — to pull priority capacity forward through Transition Cycle 2.

94

applications received

26.6 GW nameplate

51

projects selected

39 uprates + 12 new

9,361

MW UCAP added

≈ 11.7 GW nameplate

2030

90% online by

all online by 2031

UCAP – Unforced Capacity after accounting for historic forced outages.


Current Queue Status



States With Ready-To-Build GW





Interconnection Queue Progress



PJM cites many of these projects as delayed due to permitting, siting and supply chain issues.

Breakdown by state



Status options: Active, Engineering Procurement, Under Construction which comprise 37% of queue. Does not include 63% of projects which were withdrawn.

Reliability Backstop Procurement Bilateral RFP




- Submissions were solicited for load and resources
- Published June 2026
- Proposals received July 21, 2026
- Up to 15-year term
- From 2028/29 to 2042/43
- PJM will administer
 - Central Procurement path for 2028 to 2030, and
 - Facilitated Bilateral Matchmaking path for longer term needs
- Initial results to be published December 2026.


DEMAND SHOCK

Large loads and data centers


- AI and data-center demand causing concerns.
- June 18, 2026 (Docket RM26-4) — FERC issued Section 206 show-cause orders to all six jurisdictional RTOs, giving them 60 days to justify or reform large-load tariffs.
- The order sets a 20 MW large-load threshold.
- NERC formed Large Load Working Group (LLWG) to discuss reliability issues and propose requirements
- MISO and PJM stakeholder groups are working in parallel to identify ways to improve situational awareness
- Engage with RF and follow developments [here](#)



Datasets from [Home | Grid Status](#)



Pricing and power plant information



Project details are available

Interconnection / Abes Run Solar PJM EARLY ACCESS

Current Status

Under Construction

Capacity

8.1 MW

Fuel

Solar

Last Updated

Jul 1, 2026

Status Changes

2

Status Milestones

Showing the complete interconnection process for this project. Previous milestones are marked as completed, and the current status is highlighted.

✓

Queue Position

✓

Feasibility Study

✓

System Impact Study

✓

Facilities Study

✓

IA Executed

✓

Under Construction

Oct 7, 2025

Projected COD Timeline

📅 Projected COD

Sep 1, 2026

Project Details



Project Name

Abes Run Solar

ISO

PJM

Queue ID

AF2-039

Capacity

8.1 MW

Fuel

Solar

THE LONG VIEW

Transmission planning & FERC Order 1920



Plan for the long term - 20 year horizon

Measure what matters - Minimum of seven scenario factors and benefits

Allocate the cost - set defaults with state input

Build smarter - alternative technologies and local planning transparency

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Scale	RTOs coordinate roughly two-thirds of U.S. electricity demand under FERC — MISO and PJM both sit within ReliabilityFirst.
Pressure	Resource adequacy is the significant challenge: retirements and data-center load growth are outpacing new supply.
Fast tracks	PJM's RRI and CFP and MISO's ERAS are purpose-built tools to add priority capacity faster.
Reform	FERC Order 1920 reshapes long-term regional transmission planning and cost allocation.
Watch	Interconnection queues and large-load tariffs are the live fronts to track through 2026.

How to learn more...



- Create account on [website](#)
- Select alerts, mailing list subscriptions, calendar sync
- Utilize help center knowledge articles, training courses and BPMs
- Review materials and attend RASC, IPWG, Advisory Committee sessions with Board
- Follow items on MISO [Dashboard](#)



- Create account on [website](#) and coordinate with your organization admin
- Sign up for alerts, committee updates, etc.
- Access library, training materials and Manuals
- Review materials and attend Members and Markets & Reliability Committee meetings
- Issue Tracking [page](#)


Questions?

Joan M Soller, PE
sollerjmarie@gmail.com



Appendix

NERC Electric Reliability Organizations (EROs)



Helpful links

- FERC RTO [page](#)
- PJM Interconnection reform [update](#)
- Grid Status service <https://www.gridstatus.io/interconnection-queue?ref=blog.gridstatus.io>
- NREL Data center [map](#)

GENERATE: THE GAME OF ENERGY CHOICES

August 18, 2026





For our Virtual Players,
please join Slido!
#RFBootcamp

FIRST THINGS FIRST- ESTABLISH YOUR TEAM!



Cost Control

Time-Keeper

Recorder

Spokesperson

OVERVIEW

Teams will each be responsible for a grid and will have a unique mix of energy pieces

You will need to design your grid with your choice of resources from your listed energy pieces. No trading and no cheating!

Each piece has associated costs and emissions

They are an approximation for the fun of the game, designed by the EPA in 2021

Teams compete to get the total lowest cost

Hopefully you have someone good at math on your team

Each round will present new challenges and opportunities

Carbon pricing, more renewables, efficiency options, a spinning wheel of chance, the ability to broker deals with other teams for different energy pieces...



For our Virtual Players,
please join Slido!
#RFBootcamp



GENERATE: THE GAME OF ENERGY CHOICES

The game board
= the "grid"

This board will be used for multiple rounds

Each team can be thought of as a region, state,
or country

Goal is to completely fill the grid with energy
pieces to achieve lowest total cost

Pieces may not overlap, extend past the grid, or
be placed sideways



TEAM 2

DIRECTIONS


1. Fill the grid with energy sources at the lowest total cost.
2. Energy sources must be horizontal and cover the entire grid. They can not go outside the grid. You may use any combination of energy sources.
3. $TOTAL\ COST = (Purchase\ Cost) + (Annual\ Cost \times 30) + (CO_2 \times CO_2\ Cost \times 30)$
4. The 1st round of the game will not have a CO_2 cost, so this will be zero.
5. Now, go GENERATE!



COMPLETELY COVER THE GRID
WITH ENERGY SOURCES

TYPES OF PIECES

FOSSIL ENERGY




NUCLEAR ENERGY



BIO-BASED ENERGY



RENEWABLE ENERGY



PIECES AND PARTS

Type:


What primary energy resource does it use?

AQ Impacts:

How much air pollution is produced?
Scale is 0-3 waveforms

Size:

How much energy does it produce?



CO₂ emissions:

How much CO₂ does it produce each year?

Purchase Cost:

How much does it cost up front to build/purchase?

Annual Cost:

How much does it cost each year to run/operate?

$$\text{Cost per piece} = 63 + (7 \times 30) = 273$$

Assumed Lifetime:

All energy pieces will last 30 years

$$\text{Round 1: Cost per piece} = \text{Purchase cost} + (\text{Annual Cost} \times 30)$$

ROUND ONE: LEAST COST

Goal is to completely fill the grid with energy pieces to achieve lowest total cost

Pieces may not overlap, extend past the grid, or be place sideways

Cost per piece =

$$\text{Purchase cost} + (\text{Annual Cost} \times 30)$$



$$\begin{aligned}\text{Cost per piece} &= 63 + (7 \times 30) \\ &= 273\end{aligned}$$



$$\begin{aligned}\text{Cost per piece} &= 222 + (2.6 \times 30) \\ &= 300\end{aligned}$$



BREAK FOR SCORING

ENERGY TRADERS & THE WHEEL OF CHANCE

Players may swap pieces between their teams.

Players can trade any number or types of pieces, so long as both teams agree to the trade.

Teams will have a limited time to trade before Round 2 begins.



<https://spinthewheel.io/wheels/pifOJYFjXW81LJ0OdgXocz0xJmU9MQ==>


ROUND TWO: CO₂ PRICE & RENEWABLES

Must completely fill the grid with energy pieces to achieve lowest total cost

Pieces may not overlap, extend past the grid, or be place sideways

Cost per piece =

$$\text{Purchase cost} + (\text{Annual Cost} \times 30) \\ + (\text{CO}_2 \text{ emissions} \times \text{CO}_2 \text{ price} \times 30)$$



CO₂ price = 1



$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cost per piece} &= 63 + (7 \times 30) \\ &\quad + (1.2 \times 1 \times 30) \\ &= 309 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cost per piece} &= 222 + (2.6 \times 30) \\ &\quad + (0 \times 1 \times 30) \\ &= 300 \end{aligned}$$



BREAK FOR SCORING


ROUND 3: IT ALL COMES TOGETHER

Cost per piece =

$$\text{Purchase cost} + (\text{Annual Cost} \times 30) + (\text{CO}_2 \text{ emissions} \times \text{CO}_2 \text{ price} \times 30)$$


$$\text{CO}_2 \text{ price} = 4$$

$$\text{AQ total} \leq 10$$



$$\text{Cost per piece} = 63 + (7 \times 30) + (1.2 \times 4 \times 30) = 417$$

AQ = +1



$$\text{Cost per piece} = 40 + (0 \times 30) + (0 \times 4 \times 30) = 40$$

AQ = +0



$$\text{Cost per piece} = 222 + (2.6 \times 30) + (0 \times 4 \times 30) = 300$$

AQ = +0



BREAK FOR SCORING

THE SHORT COMINGS:

- This doesn't capture everything:
 - Resource issues
 - Environmental concerns
 - Any severe weather
 - Weather in general
 - Essential reliability resources
 - Ramping, min/max runtime, voltage or frequency control
 - Demand Response
 - Large loads and changing demand

Water, water, every where
And all the boards did shrink;
Water, water, every where
Nor any drop to drink

Water Use per Piece



Nuclear **74**



Coal with CCS **43**



Coal **16**



Biomass **8**



Natural Gas **4**

Join us for our Fall Reliability & Security Summit

 RELIABILITY FIRST

FALL RELIABILITY & SECURITY SUMMIT



SEPT. 14-16, 2026



COLUMBUS, OHIO



9:30 – 10:30 AM	State energy leadership outlook fireside chat: Policy reliability, and the future of the grid	• Suzanne Jaworowski, Secretary of Energy and Natural Resources, State of Indiana • Tim Gallagher, President & CEO, RF
10:30 – 11:00 AM	Networking break	
11:00 AM – 12:00 PM	Managing the AI era: Reliability challenges and opportunities related to large computational loads	• Stacey Burbure, Senior Vice President of Transmission Regulatory Engagement & Compliance, AEP • Dennis Deters, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio • Julie LaBella, Vice President – Regulatory & External Affairs, Talen Energy • Craig Sundstrom, Head of Energy and Sustainability Public Policy, Americas, Amazon Web Services
12:00 – 1:00 PM	Lunch	
1:00 – 2:00 PM	The evolving threat landscape: Protecting critical energy	Garris Ference, Intel Analyst, FBI

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