




Joint Review of Protection System Commissioning Webinar

Monday, January 24, 2022
2:00-3:30pm Eastern Standard Time

PUBLIC



Welcome and Logistics

- This WebEx event is not being recorded.
- Today's presentations will be posted to RF public website at rfirst.org.
- Please submit all questions through Slido instead of the WebEx chat.
- For your convenience, we will provide the workshop survey live at the end of event via Slido, so please stay on the call.

Join the
conversation at
Slido.com
#Commissioning



RF Anti-Trust Statement

It is ReliabilityFirst's policy and practice to obey the antitrust laws and to avoid all conduct that unreasonably restrains competition. This policy requires the avoidance of any conduct which violates, or which might appear to violate, the antitrust laws. Among other things, the antitrust laws forbid any agreement between or among competitors regarding prices, availability of service, product design, terms of sale, division of markets, allocation of customers or any other activity that unreasonably restrains competition.

It is the responsibility of every ReliabilityFirst participant and employee who may in any way affect ReliabilityFirst's compliance with the antitrust laws to carry out this policy.



Agenda


Presentation	Presenter	Time (Eastern)
Welcome and Introductions	Michelle Cross, RF	2:00 – 2:05
Joint Review Recommendations and Findings	Bill Crossland, RF	2:05 – 2:30
Misoperations and Commissioning in the RF Region	Thomas Teafatiller, RF	2:30 – 2:45
Enhancing Oversight and Peer Reviews – Case Studies	Jim Kubrak, RF	2:45 – 3:05
Commissioning Inverter Based Resources	Rich Bauer, NERC	3:05 – 3:25
Closing Remarks	Michelle Cross, RF	3:25 – 3:30



FERC/NERC Protection System Commissioning Joint Technical Report

Bill Crossland – Principal Engineer, Protection
RF Joint Review of Protection System Commissioning Webinar
24 January 2022

PUBLIC



History of the Commissioning Debate

- For some time now, FERC has suggested there is a need for a NERC Standard on Protection System commissioning, pointing out various high-profile events as evidence
- In June 2016, FERC issued Order 824 to gain access to all the NERC Section 1600 data to allow them to perform their own analytics
- Their review of a sample of MIDAS data suggested there was a correlation between the data and inadequate commissioning testing that led to Protection System Misoperations



History of the Commissioning Debate (cont'd)

- NERC and industry have maintained that such a standard would not allow enough flexibility to test Protection Systems in the traditional methodology used by each Entity (too prescriptive) and would be extremely burdensome to track compliance
- As a compromise, NERC engaged the IEEE Protection System and Control Subcommittee (PSRC) to develop a Protection System commissioning guideline document (Working Group I25 or WG I25)



IEEE WG I25 Report

The WG I25 report is more focused on how to stand up a commissioning program rather than prescribing specific actions and testing procedures

➤ **Core elements of a commissioning program:**

- Planning and sequencing
- Print and technical review
- Preparing installed equipment for modification
- Equipment and device acceptance testing
- Equipment isolation
- Functional testing
- In-service load checks
- Documentation



Joint Technical Review

- As a result of the previously-mentioned MIDAS data analysis, FERC approached NERC and its Regional Entities to conduct a joint technical review that benchmarked Entity practices for commissioning Protection Systems against the recommended practices contained in WG I25 guidance
- The joint team selected eight Registered Entities from across the ERO to participate in this effort, along with one contracting firm that conducted commissioning testing



Joint Technical Review

- The team developed a set of interview questions based on the WG I25 report
- Entity responses were benchmarked against the guidance in the WG I25 report
- Responses beyond the WG I25 report recommendations were considered a “best practice”
- Responses that were inferior to the WG I25 report recommendations were considered an “area for improvement”



Review Criteria

The joint team focused on the following elements when reviewing the Protection System Commissioning (PSC) program of each participant:

- Stated goals and objectives
- Well-defined plans to perform commissioning
- Clearly identified lines of responsibility
- Authority given to responsible parties
- Feedback methods to improve the plan



Common Issues

The joint team determined that these common issues in PSC programs impact Misoperations:

- Lack of independent review of Protection System designs by the commissioning group prior to construction activities
- Lack of centralized overarching PSC programs that serve as a tool for the execution of PSC procedures
- Lack of feedback controls to prevent repeated problems from previous projects impacting future PSC projects



PSC Program Recommendations

Recommendations and opportunities for improvement for PSC programs. Entities should:

- Have a documented PSC program
- Include goals and objectives for its PSC program
- Review PSC program to include adequate detail for commissioning test plans
- Have separate commissioning personnel from its design and installation personnel
- Have well-documented training requirements that include classroom and on-the-job elements, as well as proficiency assessments
- Have internal controls to track and correct issues to improve its PSC program



PSC Procedure Recommendations

Recommendations and opportunities for improvement of PSC procedures:

- Use of detailed PSC checklists to identify each task and deliverable in the commissioning procedure
- Entities should ensure contracts written with external contractors require a design review by their commissioning team
- Entities should compare its acceptance testing practices with WG I25 Section 3
- Entities should maintain an isolation log
- Entities should perform both functional and in-service tests
- In-service tests provide thorough check of voltage and current circuits to verify proper magnitude and phase relationships



PSC Procedure Recommendations

Recommendations and opportunities for improvement of PSC procedures (cont'd):

- Entities should use end-to-end testing for all communication-based protection schemes
- Entities should test for all types of faults (each phase to ground, phase to phase and three phase)
- Entities should perform a final walkdown upon completion of in-service testing using a checklist to document the results
- Entities should update PSC documentation as necessary to reflect current conditions



Noted Best Practices

Some noted best practices:

- Some participants used oversight personnel to review and evaluate contractor performance
- One participant required company SME to review and sign off on commissioning test results done by contractors
- Some participants have detailed training and qualification processes to evaluate personnel to lead commissioning projects
- Some participants used peer reviews to access commissioning test results to avoid possible bias



Noted Best Practices

Some noted best practices (cont'd):

- Some participants employ back-to-back testing in a lab environment and end-to-end testing in the field to commission tie lines between Entities to confirm designs and relay settings function as intended
- One participant identified all equipment that was put in an abnormal state are identified in the engineering package for each stage of the project
- Some participants used physical tags in association with the isolation log
- One participant used three phase primary injection to verify phasing, ratio and polarity on all current circuits



Summary

- Many items in the WG I25 report are currently done by Entities, but any gaps in the process can introduce an entry point for errors
- A good starting point for Entities wanting to refine their commissioning program would be to do an honest assessment of your program against the WG I25 report
- As long as the root cause of high-profile events continues to point to inadequate commissioning, FERC will continue to push for a commissioning standard



Reference Material

- [IEEE PSRC I25 WG Commissioning Testing of Protection Systems 10 May 2017](#)
- [FERC Joint Review of Protection System Commissioning Programs 2Nov2021](#)



Questions & Answers


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Misoperations and Commissioning in the RF Region

Thomas Teafatiller – Principal Engineer, Protection
RF Joint Review of Protection System Commissioning Webinar
24 January 2022

Public



Discussion Topics

- Overall ERO Enterprise Misoperation trends
- RF-specific Misoperation performance results
- Drivers of Misoperation challenges
- Ongoing RF initiatives to improve performance



ERO Enterprise – Misoperation Rates






Chart sourced from the NERC 2021 State of Reliability Report
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/PA/Performance%20Analysis%20DL/NERC_SOR_2021.pdf




ERO Enterprise – Misoperation Count



ERO Enterprise – Operations




RF Misoperation Rate




RF Misoperation Count – Equipment Type


RF Misoperation Count by Equipment Type and year
2017-2021 Q3



RF Misoperation Count - Cause



RF Misoperation Count – Human Performance



Performance Improvement Initiatives

- Protection Subcommittee
- Misoperation Peer Review Team
- Protection System/Human Performance Workshops
- Substation Maintenance Community of Practice
- RF Outreach: Entity Engagement and the One-on-One outreach



RF Protection Subcommittee (PS)

Educate, review, and discuss protection system related issues and misoperations with industry subject matter experts with the goal to improve operational performance

- Consists of relay experts from companies in the RF footprint
- Meets quarterly
- Reviews system events initiated by protection system components (lessons learned)
- Discusses and provides guidance to NERC PRC Reliability Standards
- Provided annual training sessions by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories University (SELU) on line protection topics from 2015-2019



Misoperation Peer Reviews

Review conducted to ensure accurate record keeping and understanding of protection system misoperations

- Conducted quarterly by subgroup of the PS
- Educational opportunity by allowing participants to review a wide variety of misoperations
- Unique misoperations are presented at the PS for risk awareness and performance improvement efforts



Protection/Human Performance Workshops

- **Spring 2017 Reliability Workshop focused on Misoperations**
- **Annual Protection System Workshops for Technical Personnel:**
 - Power Line Carrier Failure – 2015
 - Commissioning and Testing – 2016
 - Human Performance in Design – 2017
 - Protection System Drawings – 2018
 - Asset Management Tools, the future of Managing Protection System Data – 2019
 - Misoperation investigation inside the substation and CAP Bank Protection – 2020
 - Commissioning – 2021
- **Annual Human Performance Workshops beginning in 2018**
- **Short Circuit Modelers Workshop in June 2019 to support a biennial short circuit survey conducted by the Protection Subcommittee to validate short circuit models between entities to help reduce Misoperations on interconnections**



Entity Engagement

- Internal Controls Evaluations
 - Assist Visits
- Entity Engagement has conducted at least two in-depth Protection System Operation/Misoperation process reviews with great success
- RF cross-departmental team has conducted multiple one-on-one Misoperation discussions with Entities to learn their best practices and lessons learned

What Entities Can Do To Reduce Misops

- Participate and be involved with the Protection Subcommittee
- Entity Relay Protection SMEs should be a member of the Misoperation Peer Review Team
- Partner with the RF Entity Engagement Team to evaluate your company's processes and controls
- Have a second set of eyes review relay settings and commissioning testing procedures



Questions & Answers


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
Enhancing Oversight and Peer Reviews – Case Studies

**Jim Kubrak – Manager, Operations and Planning Monitoring
Joint Review of Protection System Commissioning Webinar
January 24, 2022**


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Commissioning Objective



Entities Should Perform Both Functional and In-service Tests




Final Walk-down

Entities should perform a final walk-down after the in-service testing is completed and use a checklist to document the visual inspection


- **Should also provide adequate “close out time”**
 - Organizing prints
 - Ensure data is received to update model, as left settings




Adequate Close Out Time Once Project is Completed



Print 1



Print 1



Print 1




Communication platform that can provide awareness of near misses, human error, design traps, etc.


- Safety Meetings
- Utilizing Technology



Entities Should Maintain an Isolation Log



Entities Should Perform End-to-end Testing for Communication Relays



Checklist

Entities' individual technicians should use a consistent and complete PSC test checklist that identifies specific tasks and deliverables/objectives in the commissioning procedure



Take Away

Setting up the next person for success



Questions & Answers

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IBR Commission Testing

Rich Bauer

Associate Principal Engineer – Event Analysis

RF Industry Webinar – Commissioning and Misoperations

January 24, 2022

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY



IBR Commission testing

- **Commission testing of conventional protection systems**
- **Commission testing of IBRs is different**
- **Commission testing of IBRs needs to verify the dynamic model of the facility**



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1,200 MW F...

Solar Photo...

Resource In...

Disturbance

Southern California

June 2017

NERC
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RELIABILITY CORPORATION

900 MW Fa...

Solar Photo...

Resource In...

Disturbance

Southern California

Joint NERC and WECC

February 2018

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Southern California

Joint NERC and WECC

May 11, 2018

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November 2020

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Odessa Disturbance

Texas Events: May 9, 2021 and June 26, 2021

Joint NERC and Texas RE Staff Report

September 2021

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Industry Recommendation

Loss of Solar Resources during Transmission Disturbances due to Inverter Settings

Initial Distribution: June 20, 2017

NERC identified a potential characteristic exhibited by some inverter-based resources, particularly utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) generation, which reduces power output during fault conditions on the transmission system. An example of this behavior has been observed during recent BPS disturbances, highlighting potential risks to BPS reliability. With the recent and expected increases of utility-scale solar resources, the cause of this reduction in power output from utility-scale power inverters needs to be widely communicated and addressed by the industry. The industry should identify reliability preserving actions in the area of power system planning and operations to reduce the system reliability impact in the event of widespread loss of solar resources during faults on the power system.

For more information, see the [1,200 MW Fault-Induced Solar Phenomena Resource Interconnection Purposes Report](#).

[About NERC Alerts](#)

Status: Acknowledgment Required by Midcontinent on June 27, 2017
Reporting Required by Midcontinent on August 31, 2017

PUBLIC: No Restrictions
[More on heading](#)

Instructions: This recommendation provides specific actions NERC registered entities should consider taking to respond to a particular issue. Pursuant to Rule EIO of NERC's Rules of Procedure, NERC registered entities shall: 1) acknowledge receipt of this advisory within the NERC Alert System; and 2) report to NERC on the status of their activities in relation to this recommendation as provided below. For U.S. entities, NERC will compile the responses and report the results to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Industry Recommendation

Loss of Solar Resources during Transmission Disturbances due to Inverter Settings - II

Initial Distribution: May 1, 2018

NERC has identified adverse characteristics of inverter-based resource performance during grid faults that could present potential risks to reliability of the BPS. As the penetration of inverter-based resources (particularly solar PV resources) continues to increase in North America, these adverse characteristics need to be widely communicated. This Level 2 Industry Recommendation alerts the industry to these adverse characteristics observed with BPS-connected solar PV resources, and provides recommended actions to address fault ride-through and timely restoration of current injection by all inverter-based resources connected to the BPS. (See Background section for more information.)

Although this NERC Alert pertains specifically to BE solar PV resources, the same characteristics may exist for non-NEC solar PV resources connected to the BPS regardless of installed generating capacity or interconnection voltage. Owners and operators of these facilities are encouraged to consult their inverter manufacturer, review inverter settings, and implement the recommendations described herein. While this NERC alert focuses on solar PV, we encourage similar activities for other inverter-based resources such as, but not limited to, battery energy storage and wind resources.

For more information, see the October 9, 2017 Canyon 2 Fire [Disturbance Report](#).


[About NERC Alerts](#)

Status: Acknowledgment Required by Midcontinent on May 8, 2018
Reporting Required by Midcontinent on July 31, 2018

PUBLIC: No Restrictions
[More on heading](#)

* These resources do not meet the Bulk Electric System definition, and are generally less than 75 MW and connected to transmission-level voltage.
** To the extent that Canadian jurisdictions have implemented laws or requirements that vary from Section EIO of the ROP, NERC requests entities in such jurisdictions voluntarily participate in response to this Alert.

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY



RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

3353 Peachtree Road NE
Suite 600, North Tower
Atlanta, GA 30326
404-446-2560 | www.nerc.com

The image shows a screenshot of a NERC report cover. The main title is "Odessa Disturbance" in large blue font. Below it, the subtitle reads "Texas Events: May 9, 2021 and June 26, 2021" and "Joint NERC and Texas RE Staff Report". The date "September 2021" is also visible. A red circle highlights the word "Modeling" in red text, with a red arrow pointing from the circle to the word "Odessa" in the title. The NERC logo is at the top left. At the bottom, there is a banner with the text "RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY" and a row of four images: a control room, cooling towers, a power line tower, and solar panels. Contact information for NERC is provided at the bottom right.

NERC
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RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Odessa Disturbance

Texas Events: May 9, 2021 and June 26, 2021
Joint NERC and Texas RE Staff Report

September 2021

Modeling


RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

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Atlanta, GA 30326
404-446-2560 | www.nerc.com

FERC Interconnection Procedure

- **Interconnection Request**
- ↓
- **Feasibility Study**
- ↓
- **System Impact Study**
- ↓
- **Facilities Study**
- ↓
- **Interconnection Agreement**
- ↓
- **Construction**
- ↓
- **Trial Operation/Commissioning**
- ↓
- **Commercial Operation**

Interconnection Procedure



- **3.4 Valid Interconnection Request.**
- **3.4.1 Initiating an Interconnection Request.**
- To initiate an Interconnection Request, Interconnection Customer must submit all of the following: (i) a \$10,000 deposit, (ii) **a completed application in the form of Appendix 1**, and (iii) demonstration of Site Control or a posting of an additional deposit of \$10,000...

Interconnection Request

Attachment A to Appendix 1
Interconnection Request

LARGE GENERATING FACILITY DATA

UNIT RATINGS

kVA _____ °F _____ Voltage _____
 Power Factor _____
 Speed (RPM) _____ Connection (e.g. Wye) _____
 Short Circuit Ratio _____ Frequency, Hertz _____
 Stator Amperes at Rated kVA _____ Field Volts _____
 Max Turbine MW _____ °F _____

Primary frequency response operating range for electric storage resources:

Minimum State of Charge: _____

Maximum State of Charge: _____

COMBINED TURBINE-GENERATOR-EXCITER INERTIA DATA

Inertia Constant, H = _____ kW sec/kVA
 Moment-of-Inertia, WR² = _____ lb. ft.²

REACTANCE DATA (PER UNIT-RATED KVA)

	DIRECT AXIS	QUADRATURE AXIS
Synchronous – saturated	X _{dv} _____	X _{qv} _____
Synchronous – unsaturated	X _{di} _____	X _{qi} _____
Transient – saturated	X' _{dv} _____	X' _{qv} _____
Transient – unsaturated	X'' _{di} _____	X'' _{qi} _____
Subtransient – saturated	X''' _{dv} _____	X''' _{qv} _____
Subtransient – unsaturated	X'''' _{di} _____	X'''' _{qi} _____
Negative Sequence – saturated	X _{2v} _____	
Negative Sequence – unsaturated	X _{2i} _____	
Zero Sequence – saturated	X _{0v} _____	
Zero Sequence – unsaturated	X _{0i} _____	

FIELD TIME CONSTANT DATA (SEC)

Open Circuit	T _{do} _____	T _{qo} _____
Three-Phase Short Circuit Transient	T _{d3} _____	T _q _____
Line to Line Short Circuit Transient	T _{d2} _____	
Line to Neutral Short Circuit Transient	T _{d1} _____	
Short Circuit Subtransient	T'' _d _____	T'' _q _____
Open Circuit Subtransient	T'' _{do} _____	T'' _{qo} _____

ARMATURE TIME CONSTANT DATA (SEC)

Three Phase Short Circuit	T _{a3} _____
Line to Line Short Circuit	T _{a2} _____
Line to Neutral Short Circuit	T _{a1} _____

NOTE: If requested information is not applicable, indicate by marking "N/A."

**MW CAPABILITY AND PLANT CONFIGURATION
LARGE GENERATING FACILITY DATA**

ARMATURE WINDING RESISTANCE DATA (PER UNIT)

Positive	R ₁ _____
Negative	R ₂ _____
Zero	R ₀ _____

Rotor Short Time Thermal Capacity I₂²t = _____
 Field Current at Rated kVA, Armature Voltage and PF = _____ amps
 Field Current at Rated kVA and Armature Voltage, 0 PF = _____ amps
 Three Phase Armature Winding Capacitance = _____ microfarad
 Field Winding Resistance = _____ ohms _____ °C
 Armature Winding Resistance (Per Phase) = _____ ohms _____ °C

Interconnection Request

EXCITATION SYSTEM DATA

Identify appropriate IEEE model block diagram of excitation system and power system stabilizer (PSS) for computer representation in power system stability simulations and the corresponding excitation system and PSS constants for use in the model.

GOVERNOR SYSTEM DATA

Identify appropriate IEEE model block diagram of governor system for computer representation in power system stability simulations and the corresponding governor system constants for use in the model.

WIND GENERATORS

Number of generators to be interconnected pursuant to this Interconnection Request:

Elevation: _____ Single Phase _____ Three Phase

Inverter manufacturer, model name, number, and version:

List of adjustable setpoints for the protective equipment or software:

Note: A completed General Electric Company Power Systems Load Flow (PSLF) data sheet or other compatible formats, such as IEEE and PTI power flow models, must be supplied with the Interconnection Request. If other data sheets are more appropriate to the proposed device, then they shall be provided and discussed at Scoping Meeting.

INDUCTION GENERATORS

- (*) Field Volts: _____
- (*) Field Amperes: _____
- (*) Motoring Power (kW): _____
- (*) Neutral Grounding Resistor (If Applicable): _____
- (*) I_2^2t or K (Heating Time Constant): _____
- (*) Rotor Resistance: _____
- (*) Stator Resistance: _____
- (*) Stator Reactance: _____
- (*) Rotor Reactance: _____
- (*) Magnetizing Reactance: _____
- (*) Short Circuit Reactance: _____
- (*) Exciting Current: _____
- (*) Temperature Rise: _____
- (*) Frame Size: _____
- (*) Design Letter: _____
- (*) Reactive Power Required In Vars (No Load): _____
- (*) Reactive Power Required In Vars (Full Load): _____
- (*) Total Rotating Inertia, H: _____ Per Unit on KVA Base

Note: Please consult Transmission Provider prior to submitting the Interconnection Request to determine if the information designated by (*) is required.

Interconnection request data

- **What Data do we need?**
- **Inverters do not respond according to physics**
- **Inverter characteristic/performance is determined by controls**
- **How are those controls configured?**
- **What protection is enabled?**




Figure 3.1. Basic Diagram of Solar Inverter Controls [Source: GE]




Figure 3.1. Basic Diagram of Solar Inverter Controls [Source: GE]

Model verification

- We need accurate representation of how those controls are set up
- We need accurate models





Figure 3.1. Basic Diagram of Solar Inverter Controls [Source: GE]

Interconnection Procedure




Model verification

- **During the commissioning of IBR facilities, tests must be performed to verify that the dynamic model represents the actual performance**

What does your system look like?

Summary





Questions

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
Cell (404) 357-9843

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Upcoming RF Events

Mark your calendar for **Monday, February 14** Technical Talk with RF

Link to WebEx at rfirst.org



February Agenda Topics:

- Align Update – Anthony Jablonski, RF Manager, Risk Analysis and Mitigation
- Physical Security Best Practices – Kevin Doss, CEO of Level 4 Security
- Physical Security Visitor Access – Tony Freeman, RF Principal Analyst

Upcoming ERO Events



January 27 – Talk with Texas: Colonial Pipeline Hack
February 10 – Talk with Texas: Cybersecurity Threats



March 8 - Spring O&P Reliability Seminar - Virtual
March 9 - Spring CIP Security Seminar - Virtual



February 17 – Align Training for Self Certifications



January 26 – Regional Winter Assessment Overview



Closing Remarks

Thank you for attending RF's Protection System Commissioning Webinar! Your feedback is extremely important to us and allows RF to continuously improve our webinars, workshops and outreach efforts.

Please take our event survey in Slido now at **Slido.com #Commissioning**.

